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We examine the effects of corporate governance and product market competition on the 
payout policy when firms are subject to agency problems and external financing 
constraints. We find that corporate governance and competition affect corporate payout 
decisions. In particular, payout can be an outcome of or a substitute for both governance 
and competition among firms depending on the firms’ agency costs of free cash flows 
and external financing costs. When examining both effects together, we find that product 
market competition subsumes corporate governance in relation to payout policy. Our 
results suggest that product market competition as a governance tool can be more 
effective than other monitoring mechanisms.  
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
An important issue in relation to corporate governance and firm behavior is the impact 
of governance on corporate payout policy. La Porta et al. (2000) find that firms in 
countries where investor rights and legal protections are strong tend to pay higher 
dividends. Known as the outcome model, it essentially contends that effective 
governance induces firms to disgorge more cash to shareholders, thereby reducing 
agency costs of free cash flows. However, Hu and Kumar (2004) demonstrate that firms 
with entrenched managers are more likely to pay higher dividends. Gugler (2003) finds 
that state-controlled firms that are likely to exhibit higher agency costs have higher 
payout. Therefore, contrary to the outcome model, dividends are viewed as a substitute 
for external disciplinary mechanism to mitigate managerial incentive problems in the 
absence of effective governance.  
Another strand of the literature focuses on product market competition as an 
external governance mechanism that can reduce manager and shareholder conflicts. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that competition among firms reduces private benefits 
of managerial control. In a similar vein, Allen and Gale (2000) suggest that competitive 
forces can be an effective governance tool to identify and remove incompetent managers. 
Giroud and Mueller (2010) find that product market competition mitigates managerial 
slack and is therefore a substitute for corporate governance. Consistent with the above 
argument, Grullon and Michaely (2007) find that firms in more (less) competitive 
industries have higher (lower) payout. Nevertheless, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) 
using non-US data report that firms with strong shareholder rights pay higher dividends 
in both competitive and concentrated industries. 
In this paper, we bridge these two strands of the literature by examining the joint 
effects of corporate governance and product market competition on payout policy. If 
governance or competition alone is important for a firm’s payout decision, a natural 
question that follows is the extent to which the interactions between competition among 
firms and their strength of governance influence corporate payout policy. Our 
investigation should lead to further understanding into the relative effectiveness of 
competition and corporate governance. In particular, we examine whether competition 
complements or substitutes corporate governance on corporate payout policy.   
Furthermore, we take agency costs and external financing costs into consideration 
when examining the joint effects of governance and competition. Chae et al. (2009) find 
that these two types of costs are important as they affect the relationship between 
governance and payout policy. For example, firms may reduce payout in the presence of 
agency problems despite strong governance when facing external financing constraints. 
The scope of our paper is therefore broader and more in-depth than those of recent studies 
as we examine not only the effects of both governance and competition but also 
incorporating firms’ agency problems and external financing constraints together. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that accounts for all of these linkages.  
Our empirical analysis yields the following results. First, we find that the 
relationship between corporate governance and payout changes depending on agency 
problems and external financing constraints. Under high agency costs of free cash flows, 
firms with strong governance tend to increase payout. However, when firms with strong 
governance encounter high external financing costs, they reduce cash dividends and stock 
repurchase even in the presence of high agency problems. Our findings therefore can be 
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explained by both outcome and substitution models. 
Second, competition plays an important role in a firm’s payout policy. Firms in 
less competitive (or more concentrated) industries exhibit lower payout, supporting the 
view that competition acts as an external governance mechanism. As these firms 
experience high agency costs of free cash flows, they tend to increase payout, suggesting 
that dividends are a substitute for governance. However, firms with agency problems in 
more concentrated industries reduce their total payout when facing external financing 
constraints, a relation that is consistent with the outcome model. 
Most importantly, combining the effects of corporate governance and product 
market competition reveals that the latter plays a more influential role in a firm’s payout 
decision. The importance of corporate governance appears to be absorbed by competition 
among firms. Therefore, similar to the results related to the effect of competition alone, 
firms in less competitive industries have lower payout. As these firms have high agency 
costs of free cash flows, they increase cash dividends and stock repurchases perhaps to 
mitigate conflicts between managers and shareholders. External financing constraints 
lower the payout of firms in less competitive industries despite the presence of agency 
problems.  
Our results remain robust after using other proxies for corporate governance, 
competition, agency problems, financing constraints, and firm characteristics. In sum, the 
findings are consistent with Giroud and Mueller (2010) and Allen and Gale (2000), who 
suggest that competition is a substitute for corporate governance, and that it can be more 
effective than the market for corporate control and other monitoring mechanisms.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
development of our hypotheses. Section III describes sample selection and data. 
Empirical results are reported in Section IV and Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVEOPMENT 
 
A. Agency Theory and Payout Decision 
 
In light of the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on agency theory, 
Easterbrook (1984) argues that a firm’s payout behavior can be explained by the 
principal-agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Firms pay dividends in 
return for raising external equity in the capital market where the cost of monitoring is 
lower, thereby mitigating agency costs for firms. This agency-cost based explanation is 
further extended by La Porta et al. (2000) who suggest that agency problems can be 
reduced by effective law enforcement on shareholder rights. It follows that payout can be 
related to external governance in which firms operate.       
La Porta et al. (2000) formulate two agency-based models of payout policy: the 
outcome model and the substitute model. The former states that firms that operate in 
strong external governance pay higher dividends to reduce expropriation of free cash 
flows by managers. On the other hand, the latter hypothesizes that firms in weak 
governance pay higher dividends as a substitute for the lack of governance mechanisms. 
Higher payout may help firms to establish good reputation that in turn lowers the cost of 
raising external capital.  
Accordingly, the outcome model and the substitution model predict opposite 
relations between the governance mechanism and dividend payouts. Reconciling these 
two competing hypotheses, Chae et al. (2009) find that the relationship between 
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governance and a firm’s payout decision can be changed conditional on agency problems 
and external financing constraints. For example, a firm with strong governance but high 
(low) external financing costs has lower (higher) payout in the presence of agency 
problems. They suggest that it is important to consider agency costs and external 
financing costs when examining the effect of governance on payout policy.  
 
B. Product Market Competition and Payout Decision 
 
Tracing back at least as early as Leibenstein (1966), product market competition is often 
argued to provide an alternative source of discipline for managers. Shleifer (1985) and 
Aghion et al. (1999) point out that inefficient managers in competitive industries are more 
likely to be discovered and ‘weeded out’ from firms when the relative firm performance 
benchmark is more apparent. Chevalier (1995) and Phillips (1995) highlight that 
increased competition tends to reduce ‘slacking’ or ‘shirking’. As a result, competition 
increases management effort and firm efficiency that in turn improves firm performance.  
In a similar vein, Schmidt (1997) and Raith (2003) suggest that the threat of firm survival 
and the disutility from losing jobs strengthen managerial incentives in competitive 
industries. Coupled with improved information for comparability among managers, 
agency costs can be reduced as managerial behaviors are more aligned with shareholder 
interests. Allen and Gale (2000) further argue that product market competition can be 
more effective than market scrutiny (via external financing) and internal control measures 
as a tool for governance. Along with the reasoning that competition serves as a source of 
disciplinary force, Grullon and Michaely (2007) conclude that competitive forces induce 
managers to pay excess cash.  
 
C. External Financing Constraints and Payout Decision 
 
Recent studies pay particular attention to payout policy when firms are under external 
financing constraints. Chae et al. (2009) find that firms with financing constraints tend to 
pay lower dividends despite having strong governance and high agency costs of free cash 
flows. Bates et al. (2009) document that U.S. firms increased their cash-to-assets ratio 
from 1980 to 2006 because their cash flows had become riskier. Morellec and Nikolov 
(2009) suggest that this is especially the case for firms in competitive industries for 
holding more cash as a precautionary move to cover operating losses and avoid inefficient 
closure. Therefore, firms experiencing financing constraints tend to hold more cash to 
avoid high costs of funding and hedge for future uncertainty (see Han et al. (2007), 
Haushalter et al. (2007), and Denis and Sibilkov (2010)). Conversely, if firms exhibit 
agency problems without financing constraints, competitive forces that serve as an 
effective governance mechanism may induce firms to disgorge more cash to shareholders.  
It turns out that while higher dividends mitigate agency problems that arise from the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, lower dividends help firms to 
hoard cash for precautionary needs in a competitive market. As a result, firms in 
competitive industries may have to weigh the benefits of agency cost reduction against 
the costs of financing constraints to reach an optimal payout strategy. Controlling for 
external financing constraints and agency costs of free cash flows may therefore provide 
a more complete picture on firms’ payout behavior in relation to product market 
competition. Based on the discussions in the sub-sections above, Table 1 summarizes the 
effects of corporate governance and product market competition on payout decisions. 
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Table 1 
Interrelationships among corporate governance, product market competition and 





















D. Corporate Governance Versus Product Market Competition  
 
Given the important roles of corporate governance and competition in reducing agency 
problems, current debate has shifted to the question of whether competition substitutes 
or reinforces corporate governance in payout decision. Giroud and Mueller (2010 and 
2011) demonstrate that corporate governance only matters in non-competitive industries. 
They show that weaker corporate governance leads to higher input costs, wages, and 
overhead costs. At the same time, weak governance firms experience lower firm value 
and stock returns, and a decline in operating performance, but only in non-competitive 
industries. Their findings suggest a substitute relationship between competition and 
corporate governance.  
In contrast, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) suggest that product market 
competition and corporate governance are complementary. They report that stronger 
shareholder rights protections are related to better firm performance only in competitive 
industries. They argue that competition strengthens the effect of shareholder rights 
because relative performance can be more readily compared and evaluated in competitive 
industries. It facilitates the detection of underperforming managers that may result in 
their dismissals. Therefore, shareholder rights are more effective in competitive 
industries. Despite the complementary relationship between shareholder rights 
protections and competition, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) document that it does not 
necessarily apply to payout decision as firms with strong shareholder rights have higher 
payout in both competitive and less competitive industries.        
Recent studies that examine the interactions between corporate governance and 
competition, however, do not take into consideration of agency problems and external 
financing constraints of the firms. As discussed earlier, the relationship between 
governance and payout decision can change at different levels of agency costs and 
external financing costs. Failure to account for these two types of costs may potentially 
lead to incorrect inferences when examining the relationship among competition, 
corporate governance, and payout decision. Figure 1 summarizes the interrelationship 
among each of the key variables discussed above in relation to payout decisions. The 
hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
 
H1: The relationship between corporate governance and payout policy is weaker for firms 
under agency problems and external financing constraints in competitive industries. 
 
H2: The relationship between corporate governance and payout policy is stronger for 
firms under agency problems and external financing constraints in competitive industries. 
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Figure 1 
The joint effects of corporate governance and product market competition on corporate 
payout decisions   
 
 
III.    DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Our sample is obtained from Compustat, RiskMetrics, and U.S. Census of Bureau from 
1990 to 2009. The financial information about sample firms is collected from Compustat. 
The anti-takeover provisions created by Gompers et al. (2003) for firm-level governance 
for the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 are from RiskMetrics. 
We remove firms in financial and utility industries in our final sample since the operations 
of firms in these industries are subject to different regulations and their financial 
statements may pose different analytical problems than those of regular firms. After 
excluding data with missing observations, our final sample consists of 2,714 firms and 
18,821 firm-year observations over the period of 1990-2009. Table 2 presents the 
distribution of sample firms by year. 
As Grullon and Michaely (2004) report that share repurchases have become more 
prevalent in the U.S. and U.S. firms are increasingly substituting dividends for share 
repurchases, we use both dividends and total payouts (dividends and share repurchases) 
scaled by firm’s total assets or sales to measure dividend payout ratios. The total assets 
and sales used in scaling payouts are 1-year lagged terms since dividends and share 
repurchases declared during a particular financial year are related to the information from 
financial reports in the previous year. 
We use two measures for corporate governance for robustness checks. Known as 
the G-index, Gompers et al. (2003) use the sum of scores from 24 anti-takeover 
provisions to create an index to measure a firm’s shareholder protection. A firm with 
higher G-index is said to have weak governance. The other governance measure, the E-
index, is developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009) who find that six anti-takeover provisions 
are sufficient to measure shareholder protection, i.e., staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority 
requirements for mergers, and charter amendments to summarize the level of shareholder 
right. The E-index is therefore more parsimonious than the G-index. We take the 
reciprocals of the abovementioned two governance measures (CG1=1/E-index and 
CG2=1/G-index) to estimate corporate governance. A higher CG score indicates a 
stronger governance measure for the firm. 
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Table 2 
Sample distribution by year 
 
Year N Percent 
1990 146 0.78% 
1991 1,012 5.38% 
1992 988 5.25% 
1993 992 5.27% 
1994 1,057 5.62% 
1995 1,094 5.81% 
1996 1,154 6.13% 
1997 1,162 6.17% 
1998 1,243 6.60% 
1999 1,179 6.26% 
2000 1,062 5.64% 
2001 965 5.13% 
2002 876 4.65% 
2003 869 4.62% 
2004 851 4.52% 
2005 847 4.50% 
2006 870 4.62% 
2007 863 4.59% 
2008 858 4.56% 
2009 733 3.89% 
Total 18,821 100.00% 
 
Regarding product market competition measures, we calculate the Herfindahl 
index and the four-firm concentration ratios for each industry according to Ali et al. 
(2009). The information collected from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) from the U.S. Census of 
Bureau in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 (SIC for the years 1992-1997 and NAICS for the 
years 2002-2007) is used to calculate two competition estimates.  
We also use two measures for agency problems based on Fenn and Liang (2001) 
and Chae et al. (2009). The former is defined as net operating cash flow (operating 
income after depreciation minus capital expenditure) scaled by total assets while the latter 
is earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total assets. 
Denis and Sibilkov (2010) suggest that firms can be classified as constrained if they do 
not have long-term debt rating and their debt is outstanding in that year. Thus, we define 
a firm with external financing constraints as one with long-term debt not rated by 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) or its debt is in default. Alternatively, Morellec and Nikolov 
(2009) categorize a firm as financially constrained if its credit rating is either missing or 
rated as non-investment grade. We use this proxy as another measurement for external 
financing constraints. Although there are other proxies for financing constraints such as 
dividends payout and firm size, we do not incorporate these measures because they are 
either inappropriate or highly correlated with the dependent variable in our study. 
Our control variables include most common firm characteristics such as leverage, 
firm size, and profitability. We use two measures for each of these variables according to 
Brown and Caylor (2009), Grullon and Michaely (2007), and Chae et al. (2009). Table 3 
defines each of these variables for subsequent empirical analyses.  
 





DIVt / ASSETSt-1 Cash dividends at period t/total assets at period t-1 
DIVt / SALESt-1 Cash dividends at period t/total sales at period t-1 
TPAYt / ASSETSt-1 
(Cash dividends at period t + stock repurchases at period t )/total assets at 
period t-1 
TPAYt / SALESt-1 
(Cash dividends at period t + stock repurchases at period t )/total sales at 
period t-1 
Corporate governance  
CG1 1/E-index, where E index is developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
CG2 1/G-index, where G index is developed by Gompers et al. (2003) 
Agency costs  
FCF1 (Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization)/total assets 
FCF2 (Operating income before depreciation - capital expenditures)/total assets 
DFCF1 Dummy variable equals one if FCF1 exceeds sample median of FCF1 and 
zero otherwise, where FCF1 is (Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization)/book value of assets 
DFCF2 Dummy variable equals one if FCF2 exceeds sample median of FCF2 and 
zero otherwise, where FCF2 is (Operating income before depreciation - 




DEFC1 Dummy variable equals one if a firm's credit score rated by S&P is missing or belongs to non-investment grade, and zero otherwise 
DEFC2 Dummy variable equals one if companies do not have long term debt rated by S&P long term senior debt rating, and zero otherwise 
Competition 
 
CONC1 Herfindahl Index based on Ali et al. (2009) 
CONC2 Four-firm concentration ratio based on Ali et al. (2009) 
Control variables 
 
LEV1 Long term debt / book value of equity 
LEV2 Long term debt / book value of total assets 
SIZE1 Natural log of total assets 
SIZE2 Natural log of sales 
PROFIT1 Income before extraordinary item / (book value of equity + deferred tax) 
PROFIT2 Net income / book value of equity   
 
IV.    EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
A. Summary Statistics 
 
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of sample firms. Among the four payout ratios 
we measure, there appears to be little difference in the average payout scaled by either 
total assets or sales. For the dividend payout, the average DIV/ASSETS and DIV/SALES 
are 0.0187 and 0.0182, respectively. Adding share repurchases to dividends, the average 
total payout of TPAY/ASSET and TPAY/SALES are 0.0419 and 0.0418, respectively. As 
expected, the average total payout is substantially higher than the average dividend 
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payout as Grullon and Mihcaely (2004) point out that share repurchases have become a 
common tool for distributing earnings back to shareholders. The variability in total 
payout is, however, higher than that in dividend payout, confirming that share 
repurchases are more discretionary and therefore less sticky than cash dividends.  
For governance measures, the average CG1 based on the E-index and CG2 based 
on the G-index are 0.50 and 0.11, respectively. The difference in the average CG 
measures is due to the different number of anti-takeover provisions used in constructing 
the respective index. As discussed earlier, CG1 (Bebchuk et al., 2009) consists of 6 anti-
takeover provisions compared to 24 anti-takeover provisions for CG2 (Gompers et al., 
2003).  
Using two measures of free cash flows (FCF1 and FCF2) as proxies for agency 
costs, the average FCF1 and FCF2 are 0.1485 and 0.0936, respectively. These two 
measures are similar to those obtained by Chae et al. (2009). There also appears to be 
large variations in both FCF measures as measured by their standard deviations, 
suggesting that firms may experience relatively high variability in agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. 
Interestingly, the average sample firm tends to experience financing constraints as 
defined by both measures DEFC1 and DEFC2. Furthermore, the median of one in both 
DEFC1 and DEFC2 indicates that more than half of the sample firms are classified as 
having external financing constraints. It is therefore important to factor these constraints 
when examining a firm’s payout decisions.  
Given that the two measurements for product market competition (CONC1 and 
CONC2) differ substantially, it is not surprising that their averages look quite different. 
A closer look at the standard deviations of both estimates that appear to be large relatively 
to their respective means suggests that the intensity of competition is likely to vary 
substantially across industries. A large distribution in competition levels should provide 
a robust analysis for the impact of competition on payout decisions. 
Among firm characteristics used for control variables, the average leverage (LEV1 
and LEV2) of 0.4345 (debt/equity) and 0.1486 (debt/assets) appear to be low. The 
average sample firm size of 6.3998 and 6.4710 measured by natural log of total assets 
and sales (SIZE1 and SIZE2), respectively, are moderate. With median that is close to its 
respective mean, it suggests that firm size measures are not skewed by large firms and 
are more symmetrically distributed. Our sample firms appear to be profitable with the 
average profitability of 0.1038 (PROFIT1) and 0.1115 (PROFIT 2). Since there are a few 
firms in our sample that generate large negative net incomes, we winsorize them at the 
1% and 99% levels to reduce the effect of the outliers. 
 
1. Free cash flows and external financing constraint 
 
We report the preliminary results of payout decisions by firms under different free cash 
flows and external financing constraints. Table 5 shows that firms with high free cash 
flows (DFCF1=1) have higher average dividend and total payouts than those with low 
free cash flows (DFCF1=0). This result is robust regardless how we measure payout. 
Since free cash flows are often viewed as a proxy for agency costs, it can be interpreted 
as firms with high agency costs tend to pay larger dividends and repurchase more shares 
to lower the conflict of interests between managers and minority shareholders.  
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Table 4 
Summary statistics of the sample firms 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Payouts       
DIVt / ASSETSt-1 0.0187 0.0124 0.0279 0.0000 0.9443 18,821 
DIVt / SALESt-1 0.0182 0.0109 0.0290 0.0000 0.7901 18,821 
TPAYt / ASSETSt-1 0.0419 0.0238 0.0535 0.0000 0.9443 18,821 
TPAYt / SALESt-1 0.0418 0.0219 0.0614 0.0000 0.8751 18,821 
Corporate governance       
CG1 0.5031 0.3333 0.2744 0.1667 1.0000 4,686 
CG2 0.1171 0.1000 0.0461 0.0556 0.5000 5,401 
Agency costs       
FCF1 0.1485 0.1435 0.0849 -0.5088 0.9053 18,800 
FCF2 0.0936 0.0919 0.0854 -0.5212 0.8349 18,575 
External financing constraints       
DEFC1 0.5006 1.0000 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 18,821 
DEFC2 0.8813 1.0000 0.3234 0.0000 1.0000 18,821 
Competition       
CONC1 698.0357 541.0000 540.0173 13.1000 2999.0000 9798 
CONC2 39.3010 37.9000 16.9991 3.6000 97.8000 10,168 
Firm characteristics       
LEV1 0.4345 0.2613 0.7085 0.0000 32.7024 18,794 
LEV2 0.1486 0.1307 0.1333 0.0000 0.7108 18,794 
SIZE1 6.3998 6.2567 2.1429 0.4272 13.0814 18,821 
SIZE2 6.4710 6.3762 2.0527 -2.5770 13.0354 18,821 
PROFIT1 0.1038 0.1087 0.1589 -6.2957 1.7380 17,939 
PROFIT2 0.1115 0.1165 0.1668 -6.2957 1.7380 18,807 
       
However, the relationship between free cash flows and governance mechanisms is 
mixed. Using CG1 (E-Index) as a proxy for governance measures, firms with higher 
(lower) free cash flows are associated with stronger (weaker) governance (0.5095 vs. 
0.4938). The results are different when CG2 (G-index) is considered. That is, the average 
CG2 for firms with higher free cash flows is 0.1156 compared to 0.1192 for firms with 
lower free cash flows. However, unlike the stark difference in payout between firms of 
high and low free cash flows, the differences in governance measures between these two 
types of firms do not appear to be economically significant. Richardson (2006) suggests 
that the difference in the results between the two governance measures can be related to 
some governance provisions that mitigate agency problems more than others do.  
On the relationship with competition, we use two estimates for industry 
concentration according to Ali et al. (2009). A lower industry concentration measure 
indicates more intense competition than a higher counterpart does. As shown in Table 5, 
both concentration scores, CONC1 and CONC2, are negatively related to free cash flows, 
suggesting that more (less) competition is related to higher (lower) free cash flows. This 
relationship is consistent with Morellec et al. (2009), Han et al. (2007), Haushalter et al. 
(2007), and Denis and Sibilkov (2010), who find that firms facing more competition tend 
to hold more cash for precautionary needs and hedge for future uncertainty.  
As expected, firms with higher free cash flows are also characterized with lower 
leverage (LEV1 and LEV2), bigger firm size (SIZE2), and higher profitability (PROFIT1 
and PROFIT2) than firms with lower free cash flows.  
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Table 5 
Mean comparison by agency costs of free cash flows and external financing constraints 
Variable Total DFCF1=1 DFCF1=0 t-test DEFC1=1 DEFC1=0  t-test 
Dividend payouts         
  DIVt/ASSETSt-1 0.0187 0.0242 0.0133 -27.242 *** 0.0176 0.0267 14.457 *** 
  DIVt/SALESt-1 0.0182 0.0226 0.0138 -21.144 *** 0.0168 0.0279 17.088 *** 
  TPAYt/ASSETSt-1 0.0419 0.0575 0.0266 -41.447 *** 0.0403 0.0533 10.760 *** 
  TPAYt/SALESt-1 0.0418 0.0545 0.0293 -28.837 *** 0.0399 0.0554 11.236 *** 
Corporate governance         
  CG1 0.5031 0.5095 0.4938 -1.922 ** 0.5109 0.4738 -3.764 *** 
  CG2 0.1171 0.1156 0.1192 2.771 *** 0.1199 0.1060 -9.036 *** 
Agency costs  +++        
  FCF1 0.1485 0.2022 0.0961 -110.000 *** 0.1469 0.1605 7.131 *** 
  FCF2 0.0936 0.1545 0.0327 -140.000 *** 0.0921 0.1043 6.285 *** 
Competition          
  CONC1 698.0357 675.7606 719.7984 4.039 *** 693.5830 733.1368 2.292 ** 
  CONC2 39.3010 39.0246 39.5660 1.606  38.8431 42.8119 7.541 *** 
Firm characteristics 
  LEV1 0.4345 0.3686 0.4988 12.650 *** 0.4082 0.6299 13.957 *** 
  LEV2 0.1486 0.1323 0.1645 16.669 *** 0.1430 0.1902 15.788 *** 
  SIZE1 6.3998 6.3985 6.4011 0.080  6.0695 8.8526 63.502 *** 
  SIZE2 6.4710 6.5500 6.3939 -5.219 *** 6.1550 8.8171 63.392 *** 
  PROFIT1 0.1038 0.1714 0.0388 -61.459 *** 0.0981 0.1477 13.450 *** 
  PROFIT2 0.1115 0.1817 0.0430 -62.665 *** 0.1043 0.1645 16.099 *** 
 
In the presence of higher external financing constraints (DEFC1=1), firms are 
more likely to pay out less in dividends and share repurchases. Consistent with Chae et 
al. (2009), financing constraints appear to be an influential determinant of corporate 
payout policy. It is also important to note that higher (lower) financially constrained firms 
are related to stronger (weaker) governance (CG1 and CG2) but lower (higher) free cash 
flows (FCF1 and FCF2). It suggests that firms with lower credit rating or less credit 
worthiness are likely to require stronger governance mechanisms for market scrutiny to 
raise external capital.     
Firms that experience financing constraints are also associated with intense 
competition. For example, the average CONC1 of 693.58 for firms under higher 
financing constraints (DEFC1=1) is less than 733.13 for firms with lower financing 
constraints (DEFC1=0). It indicates that firms facing more competition (i.e., lower 
concentration score) are likely to have lower credit rating and therefore less ability to 
raise external funds. It follows that firms under external financing constraints tend to be 
smaller firms (SIZE and SIZE2) and have lower leverage (LEV1 and LEV2) and 
profitability (PROFIT1 and PROFIT2). 
For robustness checks, we run Wilcoxon’s rank sum test to examine the median 
differences of the determinants discussed above. Table 6 presents the comparisons in 
median sorted by free cash flows and financing constraints. Overall, the results are 
consistent with those reported in Table 5. In particular, firms with high free cash flows 
but lower financing constraints tend to pay higher dividends and repurchase more stocks. 
Similarly, firms in more competitive environments (CONC1) are likely to experience 
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Before conducting a multivariate regression analysis of payout policy on different 
governance measures, agency problems, financing constraints, and firm characteristics, 
we estimate the correlations between these variables. Table 7 shows that for most pairs, 
the correlations are largely low and do not generally pose multicollinearity problems, 
suggesting that firm characteristics and governance measures adequately capture various 
dimensions of the governance practices of the sample firms. The only exception is the 
low correlation (0.50) between free cash flows (DFCF1) and profitability (PROFIT1), 
because a higher correlation is expected since firms with high profitability tend to have 
higher free cash flows.   
 
Table 7 
Correlations between explanatory variables 
  CG1 DFCF1 DEFC1 CONC1 LEV1 SIZE1 PROFIT 1 
CG1  1.00       
DFCF1  0.03  1.00      
DEFC1  0.00 -0.09  1.00     
CONC1  0.08 -0.06  0.04  1.00    
LEV1 -0.14 -0.22  0.19  0.01  1.00   
SIZE1 -0.04 -0.01  -0.05  0.14  0.27 1.00  
PROFIT 1  0.03  0.50  -0.16 -0.04 -0.19 0.12 1.00 
 
 
2. The interrelationship among payouts, internal governance, and competition 
 
Sequel to the univariate results of corporate governance and competition among firms, 
we now examine their impacts on payout policy in the presence of agency problems and 
external financing constraints. We begin the multivariate analysis with the effect of 
corporate governance (CG) and then investigate how payouts are affected by CG in the 
presence of agency problems (DFCF) by adding the interaction term (CG*DFCF). Based 
on the discussions in Section II, incorporating agency problems proxied by free cash 
flows should affect the impact of governance on payouts.  
Furthermore, we include an additional interaction, CG*DFCF*DEFC, to address 
changes in payout decisions when firms exhibit external financing constraints (DEFC). 
We also control for industry effect, year fixed effect, and firm characteristics such as 
leverage (LEV), firm size (SIZE), and profitability (ROE). Following Bring (1994), we 
standardize CG, DFCF, DEFC, CG*DFCF, and CG*DFCF*DEFC, to allow for direct 
comparisons on the economic significance between these regression coefficients. We 
repeat the same estimation process for product market competition (CONC).  
Finally, we examine the joint effects of CG and CONC on payout under the 
influence of agency problems and external financing conditions. We therefore add a final 
interaction term, CONC*CG*DFCF*DEFC in the multivariate regression settings. The 
joint test of CG and CONC can be summarized in the following equation, 
















where t,iPayouts  is the payouts for firm i at time t, CONCi,t is the product market 
competition, CGi,t is the corporate governance measure, DFCFi is the dummy variable of 
free cash flows, DEFCi is the dummy variable for external financing constraints, firm 
characteristics are control variables of leverage, firm size, and profitability, DIj is the 
dummy variable for industry j, DYk is the dummy variable for year k, and Hi,t is the error 
term. To address the potential bias in the standard errors of a panel data due to residuals 
correlated across firms and time, we estimate robust standard errors clustered by both 
firm and year according to Thompson (2011) and Petersen (2009). 
Since the results of corporate governance and competition are robust with both 
sets of proxies as defined in Table 3, we report the results in Table 8 based on the first set 
of estimates. Consistent with Chae et al. (2009) and Jiraporn and Ning (2006), Panel A 
shows that corporate governance (CG) is negatively and statistically related to dividend 
payouts and total payouts for 6 out of the 8 models. These results may appear to support 
the substitution hypothesis. However, when we consider agency costs of free cash flows 
(DFCF) with the interaction term, CG*DFCF, firms with stronger (weaker) governance 
tend to pay higher (lower) cash dividends and repurchase more (less) stocks. As shown 
in Panel A, the sum of both coefficients b1 and b2 is positive and significant. The results 
are therefore consistent with the prediction of the outcome model. 
Adding the interaction term, CG*DFCF*DEFC, for firms with external financing 
constraints (DEFC=1), we find that firms have lower payouts. It indicates that in the 
presence of agency costs, firms with higher external financial constraints may have little 
choice but to reduce payouts to shareholders. As a result, external financing constraints 
change the relationship between governance and payouts (b1+b2+b3 = -0.026 < b1+b2 
= 0.230) just as agency problems affect payouts. Comparing the economic significance 
of coefficients, it is interesting to note that agency costs of free cash flows (CG*DFCF) 
is slightly more influential than external financing constraints (CG*DFCF*DEFC).   
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results of the relationship between product market 
competition and payout. We find that firms in higher (lower) concentrated industries 
(CONC) are associated with lower (higher) payouts. Consistent with Grullon and 
Michaely (2007), competition serves as a disciplinary force that induces managers to pay 
more excess cash. It appears that payout is an outcome of stronger competition.    
In the presence of agency problems, one would expect that the positive 
relationship between competition and payout to be stronger according to the outcome 
model but weaker based on the substitution model. Given that the interaction term, 
CONC*DFCF, is positive in all of the 8 models reported in Panel B and reverses the 
relationship between industry concentration and payout (b1+b2 > 0 compared to b1 < 0), 
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Under both agency problems (DFCF=1) and external financing constraints 
(DEFC=1), firms in more concentrated industries tend to reduce payouts 
(CONC*DFCF*DEFC < 0). This perhaps is not surprising, as financially constrained 
firms may need to hoard cash and reduce payouts accordingly. It is important to note that 
controlling for external financing constraints just as for agency problems substantially 
affects a firm’s payout behavior. Failure to incorporate agency costs and external 
financing costs may lead to a misspecification on the relationship between governance, 
product market competition, and payout decisions.      
Finally, we investigate the joint effects of corporate governance and competition 
under agency problems and financing constraints. Panel C of Table 8 shows that industry 
concentrations remain negatively related to payout ratios. This relationship, however, is 
not affected when we add the interaction term, CONC*CG, for the effect of corporate 
governance. In other words, corporate governance appears to have little impact on payout 
when competition is considered. Our results are therefore consistent with Grullon and 
Michaely (2007), and Giroud and Mueller (2010) who argue that competition is a 
substitute for corporate governance, but contradict Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) who 
suggest that corporate governance complements competition.   
The results for agency costs of free cash flows (CONC*CG*DFCF > 0) and 
external financing constraints (CONC*CG*DFCF*DEFC < 0) in Panel C of Table 8 are 
also consistent with those for competition alone as reported in Panel B. Specifically, firms 
in more concentrated industries have higher payout in the presence of higher agency costs 
but lower payout when encountering higher financing costs. These relationships hold 
with or without the effect of corporate governance. On the other hand, corporate 
governance seems to only matter as shown in Panel A when it is considered alone. Our 
overall results are supportive of Giroud and Mueller (2011) who also find that governance 
proxy, on average, is not significant when competition is accounted for.     
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 
This paper extends the extant literature of payout policy by examining the joint impacts 
of corporate governance and product market competition under the influence of agency 
problems and external financing constraints. We confirm that both corporate governance 
and product market competition alone are important in a firm’s payout decisions. 
However, the nature and the extent of the impact depend on agency problems and external 
financing constraints faced by the firms. In particular, these constraints imposed on firms 
can reverse the relationship among governance, competition, and payout decisions. 
Therefore, payout decisions can be an outcome of or a substitute for governance.  
More importantly, we find that the importance of product market competition 
subsumes the effect of corporate governance as an effective disciplinary force in 
mitigating conflicts between managers and shareholders. These results are consistent 
with Allen and Gale (2000) and Giroud and Mueller (2011), who suggest that competition 
as a governance tool is more effective than the market for corporate control or other 
monitoring mechanisms. It follows that the best policy in strengthening governance for 
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